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GERALD W. HEANEYt
It is difficult for me to write objectively about the judicial
career of my close personal friend and colleague, Judge Don-
ald P. Lay. Not only do we share many of the same values and
philosophical approaches to the law, but we came to the Eighth
Circuit only a few months apart and have shared much to-
gether. I have turned to him for advice and counsel since my
first days on the court and will continue to do so in the future.
Judge Lay and I joined a distinguished court in 1966. Char-
lie Vogel of North Dakota was the Chief Judge. Martin Van
Oosterhout was next in line, followed by Harry Blackmun,
Charles Matthes, Pat Mehaffy, and Floyd Gibson. All were
men of character and intellect. Perhaps they were more con-
servative on many issues than Judge Lay and I, but they ac-
cepted us, helped us, and listened to what we had to say.
In that era, we had the luxury of spending a good deal of
time together. Our annual caseload was in the low four-hun-
dreds. By comparison, our court considered nearly 2,900
cases in 1991. We heard only three cases a day, which meant
fifteen a week. We ate together, usually a two- to three-hour
affair, swam together at the Missouri Athletic Club, went to
ball games together, and frequently went on fishing trips to-
gether. These trips to my cabin in Ontario were a high point
of the year. Good fishing, good food, good conversation, and
cribbage were the order of the day. Martin Van Oosterhout,
Charlie Vogel, and later Roy Stephenson, Smith Henley, and
Mike Bright frequently joined the trips.
Don was an avid golfer, the only one on the court at that
time. He quickly learned, however, that Jack Regan of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
was equally devoted to golf. He and Jack became close friends,
and spring and fall afternoons of court week would frequently
find Don and Jack on the golf course. Their friendship became
a lifelong affair that gave Don an important insight into the
problems of the district courts, an insight which served him
well when he became Chief Judge on January 7, 1980.
t Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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Don furthered this insight by sitting as a district court judge
in Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and elsewhere. He re-
mains anxious to learn how other circuits handle their work-
loads and frequently sits on other courts of appeal.
Where he gets the energy I do not know, but in addition to
carrying out his duties on our court and as a visiting judge in
other courts, he has always found time to teach law students,
first at Creighton University Law School in Omaha and then at
the University of Minnesota Law School in Minneapolis and
William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul. He rarely turns
down an invitation to speak to law students or bar groups.
Don leads a busy life, teaching, speaking, administering, and
reading, but hearing and writing cases has always been his first
priority.
While I suspect that scholars and lawyers would categorize
Judge Lay as a liberal, he always bristles when others attempt
to pigeonhole him. His opinions are there for all of us to read,
and each of us can draw our own conclusion. One thing is cer-
tain: Judge Lay played a major role in fighting gender discrimi-
nation in employment and other aspects of our society, and he
led the way on our court, and in the nation, in securing for
women the right to choose. Perhaps his dedication to ensuring
equality of opportunity for women has been influenced in part
by Miriam, his wife, and his five daughters: Catherine Sue,
Cynthia Lynn, Elizabeth Ann, Deborah Jean, and Susan Elaine.
They have always been at the center of his very busy life.
Judge Lay participated fully in the important decisions of
our court. He played a key role in ensuring equality of oppor-
tunity in education in Little Rock, St. Louis, Kansas City, and
Omaha. His dissenting opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer' laid the
foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in the same case,
a decision that gave prisoners the right to due process in pa-
role revocation proceedings. 2 He has shown consistent dedi-
cation to the First Amendment and has written several
decisions defining the rights of Native Americans. Driven by a
concern for the sanctity of life, he has insisted that persons
sentenced to death receive the full protection of the Constitu-
1. 443 F.2d 942, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting), rev'd, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
2. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
[Vol. 18
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tion. His compassion is eloquently expressed in Mercer v.
Armontrout:
Human life is our most precious possession. Our natural
instincts guide us from birth to sustain life by protecting
ourselves and protecting others. All notions of morality fo-
cus on the right to live and all of man's laws seek to pre-
serve this most important right. . . . What separates the
unlawful killing by man and the lawful killing by the state
are the legal barriers that exist to preserve the individual's
constitutional rights and protect against the unlawful execu-
tion of a death sentence. If the law is not given to strict
adherence, then we as a society are just as guilty of a hei-
nous crime as the condemned felon. It should thus be read-
ily apparent that the legal process in a civilized society must
not rush to judgment and thereafter rush to execute a per-
son found guilty of taking the life of another
3
A judge's dissenting opinions often define him more clearly
than those written for the court. In a dissent, a judge is often
able to express personal opinions and beliefs that cannot al-
ways be included when one is writing for the court, and the
excerpts that follow provide an insight into some of Judge
Lay's deeply held views.
On the fundamental liberties of the individual:
Today we are constantly concerned the powers of govern-
ment do not encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the
individual. It is almost axiomatic as government grows
there exists a lesser concern for these rights. The applica-
tion of the Bill of Rights to the Fourteenth Amendment is
reassuring to say the least. The courts above all must re-
main the guardians and watchdog of these individual rights.
We are properly concerned with the early stages of arrest
and arraignment, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the right to remain silent and not become a wit-
ness against one's self, the right to be represented by coun-
sel, the right to have a jury fairly selected, to have an
impartial forum for the trial, and even with fair pre-trial
comment by the press. The concept of "fair trial" is always
paramount.
It seems to me all of this is naught if the trial judge be-
comes the prosecutor by unfair comment in the trial itself.
This is cognate to a doctor carefully taking precautions to
inoculate a person to prevent a disease and once this being
3. 864 F.2d 1429, 1431 (8th Cir. 1988).
1992]
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assured shooting the patient in the back. The courts above
all must practice what we command others to do.4
On due process, three cases express Judge Lay's view. The
first is United States v. Spotted War Bonnet:
Innocent citizens must not be deprived of their liberty with-
out a fair trial, competent evidence, and due process of law
simply because they have been accused of child abuse. Our
zeal to protect young children from sexual abuse should not
allow courts to ignore or to diminish the constitutional
rights of any person, even those who stand accused of hei-
nous crimes.
In the second case, United States v. Conley, Judge Lay wrote:
Our forebears recognized the dangers involved when the
awesome forces of government are pitted against the mea-
ger resources of the individual whose life or liberty is at
stake. The best bulwark against those dangers in a criminal
trial is procedural fairness.6
In McClard v. United States, Judge Lay wrote:
The law asks very little in requiring the government to prop-
erly prove a case when the ultimate consequence may be to
deprive a man of his life or liberty. Courts should not be
willing to allow convictions where inferences are derived
from facts only suspected and not proved. Regardless how
zealous we are to have good communities and proper crimi-
nal law enforcement, we have contracted with the rule of
law that all men are presumed to be innocent until proven by
competent evidence to be otherwise. The basic rights of all
free men depend upon this principle.
7
On judicial responsibilities, two cases stand out. The first is
Bryant v. Rankin:
Although judges properly serve as an ultimate safeguard
to prevent a miscarriage of justice and as such possess the
legal authority to take away a jury's finding of fact, never-
theless, the exercise of that power should be used only in
exceptional circumstances. Unfortunately, this power is
4. Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 1966) (Lay, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
5. United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1364 (8th Cir. 1989)
(Lay, CJ., dissenting), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 3267 (1990).
6. United States v. Conley, 523 F.2d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1975) (LayJ, dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976).
7. McClard v. United States, 386 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1967) (Lay,J., dissent-
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often exercised merely because judges sometimes feel that
other results under the evidence are more reasonable than
what the jury found. When this occurs we act without judi-
cial authority.8
In United States v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, Judge Lay again
spoke out on judicial responsibilities:
I cannot judicially accept the reasoning that manifest in-
justice may take place in a criminal trial and yet lay beyond
the reach of appellate review because a lawyer inadvertently
failed to protect the defendant's rights in an appellate brief
.... For an appeals judge to take effective action in these
circumstances, even where counsel fails to properly pre-
serve the error, is not advocacy, but rather an urgent and
necessary exercise of judicial responsibility. If this be pro-
scribed as advocacy, the breadth and meaning ofjudicial re-
view would have been rendered meaningless long ago.
9
On the right to privacy, Judge Lay has written many vigorous
dissents, three of which stand out in my mind. The first is
United States v. Agrusa, where Judge Lay wrote:
The government's interest in law enforcement does not
outweigh the citizen's justifiable expectation that govern-
ment officials will not, under the cloak of authority, surrep-
titiously break into his home or office. I would hope there
still exists "a private enclave where [a person] may lead a
private life" without fear of stealthy encroachment by gov-
ernment officials.' 0
In another Fourth Amendment case, Judge Lay addressed
these same concerns, stating, "The fundamental principles
surrounding the fourth amendment still serve us well. Only
with the greatest caution should we whittle away basic constitu-
tional rights, for we often come to regret the unfortunate rul-
ings we have made in times of hysteria in the past."" And
finally, in Thomas v. Parett, he wrote:
It is regrettable and yet understandable that law enforce-
8. Bryant v. Rankin, 468 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1972) (Lay, J., dissenting).
9. United States v. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, 434 F.2d 1127, 1139 (8th
Cir. 1970) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 407 U.S. 385
(1972).
10. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 703 (8th Cir. 1976) (Lay, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
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ment officials resent judicial interference with otherwise
lawful convictions of wrongdoers. It is difficult to write an
opinion which allows the guilty to go free. Nonetheless,
Fourth Amendment rights of our citizens should not be sec-
ondary or collateral to other rights. 2
On the right to counsel, Judge Lay expressed his view in
Miller v. Maryland:
I sense that judicial acceptance of an alleged waiver of the
right to counsel by an immature youth is often blinded by
the heinous crime with which the youth is charged. Viola-
tion of the basic constitutional right to counsel cannot be
obviated by hindsight rationalization. Whether the confes-
sion may be corroborated by extrinsic facts, whether the in-
criminating remarks have an inherent ring of truth is beside
the point. More important is the right of each accused
youth to effective assistance of counsel at a meaningful time
in a criminal proceeding.'
3
Judge Lay has often spoken out on equality for women. In
United States Jaycees, he wrote, "The attempt of the Jaycees to
exclude women from their full membership seeks protection
under what I consider to be an outdated rationale of our juris-
prudence, one which relegated women to a status inferior to
that of men."' 4 In Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., he again
addressed the issue of equality, referring to the dismissal of a
teacher because of her pregnancy, as "the most blatant form of
sex discrimination that can exist."'
' 5
Judge Lay has always been greatly concerned with the hu-
mane treatment of prisoners. He dissented from the majority
opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer, writing,
The denial of due process in parole revocation simply mir-
rors society's overall attitude of degradation and defilement
of a convicted felon. It is sad 20th Century Commentary
that society views the convicted felon as a social outcast. He
has done wrong, so we rationalize and condone punishment
in various forms. We express a desire for rehabilitation of
12. Thomas v. Parett, 524 F.2d 779, 787 (8th Cir. 1975) (Lay, J., dissenting).
13. Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th Cir. 1978) (Lay, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
14. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1579 (8th Cir. 1983) (Lay,
C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), rev'd sub noma., Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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the individual, while simultaneously we do everything to
prevent it. Society cares little for the conditions which a
prisoner must suffer while in prison; it cares even less for
his future when he is released from prison. He is a marked
man. We tell him to return to the norm of behavior, yet we
brand him as virtually unemployable; he is required to live
with his normal activities severely restricted and we react
with sickened wonder and disgust when he returns to a life
of crime.16
In another case addressing these same rights, he wrote:
If these men, who have obviously found it difficult to live
within society's mores, are ever to enjoy life within the law
they must learn self control and discipline in an atmosphere
where self respect is maintained and the human personality
allowed to flourish. This cannot be achieved while the state
pursues a policy which requires conformity beyond need.' 7
And in Cody v. Hillard, he stated,
It is an old axiom that it is human nature to abuse power-
nowhere is this more true than in the prison setting. It is
not judicial activism to recognize constitutional intervention
when the state refuses to provide humane treatment to
those incarcerated. Federal judges who blindly interpret
the hands-off doctrine to mean that the Constitution stops
at the prison wall are grossly mistaken. A person who vio-
lates the law is separated from society as punishment for the
crime committed. He serves time in a custodial setting.
However, he is not sent to prison to have further punish-
ment inflicted upon him by inhumane treatment. To close
the eyes ofjudges by reference to the hands-off doctrine is a
throwback to the Dark Ages.
18
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the great writ of habeas
corpus came under attack. Judge Lay successfully led the fight
in the Judicial Conference, and in Congress, to preserve many
of the essential elements of the writ. In his comprehensive
statement to the HouseJudiciary Committee on May 24, 1990,
he stated:
[I]t is imperative that all of us consider the background,
16. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952-53 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (Lay, J., dis-
senting) (footnotes omitted), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
17. Rinehart v. Brewer, 491 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1974) (Lay, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
18. Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 919 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Lay, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).
1992]
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purpose, and necessity of the great writ of habeas corpus. I
find a general misunderstanding of habeas corpus even by
many who are knowledgeable in the field of criminal law.
Critics have often asserted that there should be no federal
review of state prisoner cases whatsoever-that federal
habeas corpus is simply another procedural vehicle by
which we coddle the guilty and allow criminals to go free.
The critics emphasize the need to protect the efficiency and
finality of the state court decision-making process.
I think these critics misconceive the very purpose of the
Great Writ when they look upon it as a procedural vehicle
to allow the guilty to go free. The best response to that
attack is that the rights of the best of people are only secure
as long as the rights of the worst of people are preserved. 9
IfJudge Lay's record were confined to the one area of preserv-
ing habeas, it would still be a distinguished one.
I end this essay by commenting on Judge Lay's twelve-year
role as ChiefJudge. Only Judge Walter H. Sanborn of Minne-
sota, who served for 14 years, and Judge Kimbrough Stone of
Missouri, who served for 19 years, served for a longer period
of time in the capacity of Chief Judge.
Among his accomplishments, Judge Lay expanded the Cir-
cuit Judicial Council to include district judges, formed federal
practice committees in each district to give lawyers a greater
voice in formulating new district court rules and operating
procedures, and opened the Eighth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence to all lawyers, making it the most democratic and possibly
the largest of all conferences. Judge Lay also organized circuit
and district court historical societies.
Not all of these changes came easily, and Judge Lay presided
over the court in an era of change. Our caseload grew from
1,111 in 1981 to 2,886 in 1991. Our court grew from seven
judges to eleven judges. The staff of the court grew twofold to
184, and we became fully automated. Some of us resisted
Don's efforts to modernize and open the court as rapidly as he
desired. But he kept pushing and shoving and cajoling and,
most of all, writing memos. Memo after memo would arrive
weekly, and sometimes daily, urging progress. To make mat-
19. Hearings on H. R. 4737 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 139-40
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ters more difficult, a new generation of judges came on the
court creating the additional problem of melding the views of
the old and the new. In the end, Judge Lay's hard work paid
off, and we can say today that our court is fully prepared to
meet the challenges of the 1990s under the leadership of a new
Chief Judge, Richard Arnold.
My friend and colleague will continue to serve the judiciary
and the law. He now is teaching at the University of Minne-
sota, and will shortly sit in seven circuits, as well as our own. I
am confident that Judge Lay will continue to have a profound
influence on our court for many years to come.
9
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